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In 60 secondsWhy speed matters1. Preserve evidence2. Trace domainAd libraries3. Follow the money4. Connect shops5. Information requestsCommon mistakesQuestionsSourcesThe playbook in 60 seconds
- Preserve first. Save the shop properly before you do anything else. It may be gone tomorrow.
- Trace the domain. Find out who registered it, who hosts it and which other addresses appear next to it.
- Follow the money. Payment details are often the strongest link to a real person.
- Connect the shops. One report is rarely one shop. Look for what shops share.
- Ask the right provider. Send focused information requests to the party that actually holds the data.
Why the first hours matter
A fake shop, also called a fake online store or scam website, is built to disappear. Consumer centres warn that shops are often deleted and relaunched at new addresses[1]. By the time a victim notices that nothing is arriving, files a report and the case reaches a desk, there may be nothing left to look at.
Preserve the evidence
A screenshot on its own is weak evidence. The Berkeley Protocol, the UN-backed standard for online investigations, treats the web address, the page's source code and a full-page capture as the minimum for court use[5]. It was written for international crimes, so treat it as a strong reference point and follow your own agency's rules first.
What to capture
| Capture | Why it matters | Tip |
|---|---|---|
| Identifies exactly what you saw | Copy it, do not retype it | |
| Shows the shop as a visitor saw it, including the legal notice and checkout | Capture the checkout and payment pages, not only the home page | |
| Holds hidden traces that later connect shops | Your browser's "save page" function is a start | |
| Often the best route to a real person | Note IBAN, recipient name and payment provider exactly as shown | |
| Lets others check how the capture was made | Record your name, the time and the tools used[5] | |
| A digital fingerprint that proves the file has not changed since capture | Create it at the moment of capture, using the currently accepted standard[5] |
Keep a simple evidence log
Chain of custody means a chronological record of who held the evidence, when, and what was done with it[5]. It can start as simply as this:
Trace the domain and certificates
Every shop depends on outside companies: someone registered the address, someone hosts the site, someone issued its security certificate. Each leaves traces.
| Trace | What it tells you | Limits to know |
|---|---|---|
| Registrar, registration date and often an abuse contact | Personal owner details are often hidden from the public | |
| INTL A request channel for hidden registration data on domains like .com. Open to law enforcement with an ICANN account[9] | Not all registrars take part. In the pilot, 26% of requests were approved and 55% denied[10] | |
| DE Holder details for companies are public. For private persons only the registration date and managing member show[11]. Authorities have a dedicated request form[12] | DENIC only registers domains. It stores no content and cannot take shops offline[13] | |
| EU Registries and registrars must answer lawful, justified requests within 72 hours[14]. DE In Germany this is § 50 BSIG, for authorities only[15] | The request has to be well justified | |
| Which company serves the site | Many shops sit behind Cloudflare, which is generally not the host[16]. In one network 98.6% did[17] | |
| Security certificates are recorded in public, searchable ledgers[18]. They can reveal other addresses used by the same operator | A name in a log does not prove a live site. Entries can take about a day to appear[18] |
Check the ad libraries (EU)
Half of the 653 fake-shop domains German consumer advocates checked in 2025 had advertised on Google or Meta[19]. EU In the EU, very large platforms must keep a public, searchable record of their ads, including who the ad was for and who paid, until a year after it last ran[20]. That makes these libraries a quick, free check, and no information request or special investigative measure is needed to read them.
| Where | facebook.com/ads/library, no account needed | adstransparency.google.com, no account needed |
| Search for a shop | Your brand or the shop's name, or its web address in quotes as an exact phrase. There is no dedicated domain field | Advertiser name or website, so you can enter the shop's address directly[21] |
| Set first | Country, ad category "all ads", active and inactive | Region, then date and format |
| Extra detail on EU ads | Under "EU transparency": run dates, targeting, estimated EU reach, advertiser and payer | Dates shown, targeting categories, reach per location[21], advertiser name and location, payer[21] |
| How long ads stay | EU ads: one year after the last impression. Elsewhere, most ads only while active[22] | One year after the ad last ran. New ads can take 48 to 72 hours to appear[23] |
| Shows where the ad leads | Yes, the ad's link and displayed domain | No clickable links[23] |
TikTok has a similar library covering the European Economic Area, Switzerland and the UK[24].
What the libraries can give your case
- When the shop was active, and in which countries and for which age groups it advertised.
- How far it reached, which can help you estimate the number of potential victims.
- Other shops: other ads from the same advertiser can lead to sibling shops.
- Who to ask: the platform holds the advertiser's account and payment data. See step 5.
Follow the payment trail
Addresses are cheap to replace. Getting paid is harder, so payment details often connect shops and lead to people.
| Trace | What it can tell you | Route, by country |
|---|---|---|
| The first two letters show where the bank sits, not where the account holder lives. Virtual IBANs may route to an account elsewhere[26] | DE Account retrieval via BaFin under § 24c KWG shows holders and authorised persons[27]. Other countries: see the table in step 5 | |
| Holder and account activity in another EU state | EU European Investigation Order: decision within 30 days, execution within 90[28] | |
| Whether the money has already been flagged | DE Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) at customs[29]. Prosecutors can obtain data on request[30] | |
| Merchant account, payouts, sign-up data | See step 5 | |
| Transactions are public, but names are not. An exchange may know its customer | EU Eurojust's and Europol's SIRIUS project includes contacts for crypto exchanges[31] |
One complaint, six shops
In 2023 Bavarian prosecutors described a case that started from one victim's complaint and led to six alleged fake solar shops copying real companies, with damage of at least about €140,000[32]. One report is often a way into something bigger.
Connect the shops into clusters
Treating each shop as a separate case hides the operator. A shop cluster is a group of shops that share something only their operator would share. The goal is to turn many small reports into one case.
How much does each link prove?
| Shared trace | Strength | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Strong | Money ends up in the same place | |
| Strong | Hard to explain by chance, unless it was copied from a real company | |
| Medium | Points to shared tooling, which may be sold to several groups | |
| Medium | Worth following, but the names are self-declared[33] | |
| Medium | Suggests one account behind several sites | |
| Medium | Useful, but check who manages it first | |
| Weak | Common in shop clusters[1], but thousands of unrelated sites can share one | |
| Weak | Not proof by themselves[1] |
Strength ratings are a rule of thumb from investigative practice, not a legal standard. Look for at least two independent links before you call shops connected.
What real networks looked like
75,000+ domains
More than 850,000 victims and over USD 50m in order volume, run by a core team and franchisees. About 200 shops sat on each server[34]. Researchers later linked shops through identical configuration files[17].
121 fake stores
More than 1,000 hacked legitimate websites sent visitors to fake stores using four payment processors. It was tied together by injected code and shared payment processors[35].
Send focused information requests
Ask the party that actually holds the data, and ask for specific items. The registrar knows who bought the address, the host knows who pays for the server, and the platform knows who opened the store.
Who holds what
| Party | Likely holds | How to reach them |
|---|---|---|
| Registrant details, payment for the domain | Direct request, DENIC form, RDRS | |
| Customer account, payment, access logs | Provider's law enforcement contact. Under the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA), providers must publish a contact point for authorities[36] | |
| Account data. It is generally not the host | lawenforcement@cloudflare.com with case number. Non-US governments preferably via a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT)[16] | |
| Store owner, sign-up data, payouts | Shopify's online legal access form, addressed to the correct company[37] | |
| Advertiser and account data | Online system for verified agencies, legal process required[38] | |
| Advertiser, page and payment account data | Online request system for law enforcement, legal process required[39] | |
| Account holder, transactions | See step 3 |
The legal instruments, in brief
The right tool depends on where you work. EU tools come first, then the same jobs under national law.
| EU instrument | What it covers | Key point |
|---|---|---|
| Direct cross-border orders to providers offering services in the EU. Applied since August 18, 2026, Denmark excluded[40][41] | Answer within 10 days, or 8 hours in emergencies. Preservation for 60 days. Subscriber data for all offences. Traffic and content data for offences with a maximum of at least 3 years, by a judge[42] | |
| Evidence from another EU state[28] | Slower, but wider in scope |
The same jobs in national law
| Country | Fraud offence | Who the customer is (subscriber data) | Who connected when (traffic data) | Bank accounts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE Germany | § 263 StGB: up to 5 years, up to 10 in serious cases[43] | § 100j StPO with § 22 TDDDG for digital services, also by IP address[44][45] | § 100g StPO for telecoms[46]. § 100k StPO for usage data from digital services, for serious or listed offences[47] | § 24c KWG retrieval via BaFin[27] |
| AT Austria | § 146 StGB: up to 6 months. Serious and commercial fraud (§§ 147, 148) carry more[48] | § 135(1a) with §§ 134, 137 StPO. IP lookups need a prosecutor's order[49] | § 135(2) StPO: prosecutor's order with court approval[49] | § 116 StPO[49] and the account register[50] |
| CH Switzerland | Art. 146 StGB: up to 5 years, up to 10 if commercial[51] | Art. 21, 22 BÜPF, through the federal surveillance service[52] | Art. 273 StPO: court approval, up to 6 months back[53] | Art. 265 StPO production order. Art. 284, 285 to monitor an account[53] |
| UK UKEngland & Wales | Fraud Act 2006, s.2: up to 10 years[54] | Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Part 3 ("entity data")[55][56] | Same Act ("events data"), for serious crime[55] | Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, Sch. 1 production order[57]. Customer information orders apply in money laundering and confiscation cases[58] |
| US USAfederal | 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud: up to 20 years[59] | 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2): subpoena[60] | § 2703(d): court order. Preservation under § 2703(f)[60] | Right to Financial Privacy Act routes[61]. Grand jury subpoenas are largely exempt[62] |
| FR France | Art. 313-1 Code pénal: up to 5 years[63] | Art. 60-1, 60-2 CPP requisition[64][65] | Art. 60-1-2 CPP: offences of at least 3 years[66] | FICOBA file[67][68], then a requisition to the bank |
| NL Netherlands | Art. 326 Sr: up to 4 years[69] | Art. 126na Sv for communications providers, 126nc for others[70] | Art. 126n Sv: prosecutor's order[70] | Art. 126nc, 126nd Sv[70] and the bank data referral portal[71] |
A map for orientation, not a complete statement of each country's conditions. France and the Netherlands have adopted new criminal procedure codes expected around 2029, so article numbers will change[72]. Check with your prosecutor.
What a good request contains
- The exact identifier: full web address, account name or IP address.
- The time window, with time zone.
- Specific data: for example account holder, sign-up date and payout account, rather than "all data".
- The legal basis and case number, addressed to the correct legal entity.
- A note on confidentiality. Shopify, for one, notifies users unless prohibited[37], so say if notifying the customer would harm the case.
- A preservation request if the data might otherwise be deleted.
Six common mistakes
| Mistake | Do this instead |
|---|---|
| Saving only a screenshot | Save address, source code and full-page capture, with a fingerprint |
| Opening the shop from an office connection | Use a separate research setup. The Protocol recommends masking your IP and machine[5] |
| Reading the IBAN's country as the suspect's country | It shows where the bank sits[26] |
| Asking Cloudflare for hosting data as if it were the host | It is generally not the host, so ask what it can tell you about the account and find the real host |
| Reading an ad library's advertiser name as the operator | Names are self-declared[33]. Use them as a lead and ask the platform for the account data |
| Treating every report as a new case | Check first whether shops share payment details, template or contacts |
Common questions
How do you investigate a fake shop?
Preserve the evidence first, then trace the domain, follow the payment trail, connect related shops and send focused information requests to the providers that hold the data.
What if the shop is already offline?
Check public archives and certificate logs, and ask the registrar, host and payment provider, who may still hold account data. Reports and payment details from victims also remain valuable.
Is a screenshot enough as evidence?
Rarely. The Berkeley Protocol treats the web address, source code and a full-page capture as a minimum, and recommends adding a hash and collection details.
Can I see who owns a domain?
Often not publicly. Hidden registration data can be requested, for example through ICANN RDRS for domains like .com, or through DENIC's form for authorities for .de.
What is a shop cluster?
A group of fake shops run by the same operator, which can be identified through what they share, such as a bank account, contact details or template files.
Can I use the Meta and Google ad libraries in an investigation?
Yes, as a lead. Both are public and need no account. In the EU they show run dates, targeting, reach and declared advertiser and payer details for a year after an ad last ran. The names are self-declared, so ask the platform for account data.
Do these laws apply in my country?
Each law on this page is tagged by country, such as DE for Germany or EU for the whole EU. The table in step 5 lists the comparable powers in Austria, Switzerland, the UK, the USA, France and the Netherlands.
Does the e-Evidence Regulation already apply?
Yes, since August 18, 2026, in EU member states except Denmark. It allows direct cross-border orders to service providers, with a response deadline of 10 days, or 8 hours in emergencies.
Sources
75 sources
- Verbraucherzentrale: Fakeshop glossary
- Verbraucherzentrale NRW, Apr 13, 2026: Fakeshop-Finder figures
- AV-Comparatives, Nov 2024: Fake shops detection test
- dpa via ChannelPartner, Jun 19, 2026: complaints to consumer centres
- Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations (OHCHR / UC Berkeley)
- urlscan.io: FAQ
- urlscan.io: Scan visibility
- Internet Archive: Save Pages in the Wayback Machine
- ICANN: Registration Data Request Service
- ICANN, Mar 3, 2026: RDRS two-year pilot results
- DENIC: New legal requirements for the domain query
- DENIC: Third-party requests for holder data
- DENIC: Fake shops
- NIS2 Directive, Article 28
- § 50 BSIG
- Cloudflare: Law enforcement
- heise, 38C3 report on BogusBazaar
- Certificate Transparency: How CT works
- vzbv, Nov 6, 2025: Every second fake shop advertises on Google or Meta
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act), Article 39
- Google Ads Help: About the Ads Transparency Center
- Meta: Ad Library tools
- Google Ads Transparency Center: FAQ
- TikTok: Commercial Content Library help
- ÖIAT study for KommAustria, Dec 2025: Fraud ecosystem in Meta advertising
- European Banking Authority: Report on virtual IBANs
- § 24c KWG
- Directive 2014/41/EU (European Investigation Order)
- Zoll: Financial Intelligence Unit
- § 32 GwG
- Eurojust: SIRIUS project
- Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bamberg (ZCB), Apr 2023
- ÖIAT policy brief, May 2026: Ad libraries
- SRLabs: BogusBazaar
- The Record: Phish 'n' Ships
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act)
- Shopify: Government access policy
- Google: Requests from government agencies
- Meta: Information for law enforcement authorities
- Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 (e-Evidence)
- Heuking: The e-Evidence Act applies
- KriPoZ: The e-Evidence legislative package
- § 263 StGB
- § 100j StPO
- § 22 TDDDG
- § 100g StPO
- § 100k StPO
- Austria: Criminal Code (StGB), §§ 146 to 148
- Austria: Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO), §§ 116, 134, 135, 137
- Austria: Account Register Act, § 4
- Switzerland: Criminal Code, Art. 146
- Switzerland: Surveillance Act (BÜPF), Art. 15, 21, 22, 26
- Switzerland: Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 265, 273, 284, 285
- UK: Fraud Act 2006, sections 1 and 2
- UK: Investigatory Powers Act 2016, section 60A
- UK: Investigatory Powers Act 2016, section 261
- UK: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1
- UK: Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 363
- USA: 18 U.S.C. § 1343
- USA: 18 U.S.C. § 2703
- USA: 12 U.S.C. § 3402
- USA: 12 U.S.C. § 3413
- France: Penal Code, Art. 313-1
- France: Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 60-1
- France: Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 60-2
- France: Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 60-1-2
- France: Tax Procedure Code, Art. L135 ZC
- CNIL: FICOBA, the national bank account file
- Netherlands: Criminal Code, Art. 326
- Netherlands: Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 126n to 126nd
- Netherlands: Financial Supervision Act, Art. 3:267i
- Rijksoverheid: New Code of Criminal Procedure
- US Department of Justice: CLOUD Act resources
- Polizei: Central contact points for cybercrime (ZAC)
- Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt (ZIT)
This guide is general information, not legal advice. Tags show where a law or route applies: DE Germany, AT Austria, CH Switzerland, UK United Kingdom, US United States, FR France, NL Netherlands, EU European Union, INTL international. Laws, fees and contact routes change, so check the linked source before you rely on it.